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Preeminence of Conservative Public Policy
Rationales in the Field of Accountants'
Liability and a Proposal for Tort Reform
I. Introduction
A recent trend in the accounting industry' concerns the frequency with
which juries have awarded large judgments against members of the
accounting profession. 2 Generally, the lawsuits involve non-contractual
third parties suing an accounting firm for auditing work the firm produced
in its professional capacity.3 Third party investors normally allege
negligence on the part of the accounting firm.4
The underlying factual pattern of the majority of these lawsuits
involves a similar set of circumstances. 5 First, a business hires an
accounting firm to prepare and certify an audit opinion. The accounting
firm audits the business.6 Investors then review the audit report. Based
upon the audit, 7 third party investors make a decision to invest in that

1. This article focuses mainly upon the "Big Six" Accounting firms: Arthur Anderson & Co.,
Coopers & Lybrand, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG Peat Marwick and Price
Waterhouse. See The Big Six are in Big Trouble, BusNESS WEEK, Apr. 6, 1992, at 78. This
comment uses the term "accountant" generally to include auditors and CPAs.
2. A jury ordered Coopers & Lybrand and other defendants to pay $558,700,000 to Kempner
Capital Management and National Bank of Galveston; of the total damages, Coopers & Lybrand was
responsible for $200,000,000 in punitive damages. See Andrew Pollack, Large Award in Miniscribe
FraudSuit, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 5, 1992, at DI. The Arizona Superior Court overturned a jury's verdict
requiring Price Waterhouse to pay $338,000,000 to Standard Chartered Bank. See Lee Berton, Judge
Voids Big Tort Award on Price'sAudit, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 1992, at A3. The Superior Court also
granted Price Waterhouse's motion for a new trial. Id. See infra note 189.
3. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 822 S.W.2d 592, 593 (Tenn. 1991) (third
parties typically include the following: creditors, investors, shareholders, management, directors and
regulatory agencies).
4. Third parties can recover out of pocket expenses for an accountant's professional negligence.
Denzil Y. Causey, Jr., Accountants' Liability in an IndeterminateAmount for an Indeterminate Time
to an Indeterminate Class: An Analysis of Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 57
Miss. L.J. 379, 390 (1987).
5. See Pollack, supra note 2, at Dl; Richard B. Schmidt, California Court Limits Liability of
Auditors in Negligence Cases, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 1992, at B8.
6. Willis W. Hagen II, Certified Public Accountants' Liability for Malpractice: Effect of
Compliance with GAAP and GAAS, 13 J. CONTEMP. L. 65, 66-68 (1987). An audit provides the basis
for the opinion that an accountant expresses. It is accomplished by, among other things, examining
evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements prepared by management.
Id.
7. Id. at 69-70. An unqualified audit represents the highest level of assurance that an
accountant can profess concerning the accuracy of management's financial statements. Id.
Furthermore, an unqualified audit serves as an
assurance to the client that its own perception of its financial health is valid and that its
accounting systems are reliable. The audit, however, frequently plays a second major
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particular business. If the business fails, the parties to the lawsuit have been
reduced to the accounting firm and the third parties, 8 for when the business
fails the accounting firm becomes the only remaining "deep pocket." 9
Because of the financial loss resulting from the business' failure, investors
sue the accounting firm claiming they relied upon an unqualified audit
report which was negligently prepared.'
In order for a third party to bring suit against the negligent accounting
firm, they must first have standing. The law of a particular state dictates
whether a third party has standing to bring a cause of action against an
accountant for negligence." The standard varies among the states.
States follow one of three standards which determine when a third
party can bring an action. 12 The most rigorous standard requires an
investor to demonstrate privity of relationship. 13 From this, courts have
utilized public policy to expand an accountant's duty by adopting either the
Restatement rule 4 or the foreseeability standard. 5
The belief that accountants can spread the risk of loss through
insurance supports the decision to expand an accountant's duty.1 6 As with

role: it assists the client in convincing third parties that it is safe to extend credit to or
invest in the client.
John A. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 1929, 1932 (1988).
8. The business' management has primary responsibility for "developing sound accounting
practices, maintaining adequate accounting records and preparing the financial statements." HENRY
SELLIN, ATrORNEY'S HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING § 1.04[3][a] (3d ed. 1979). While the accountant
may have been negligent in conducting the audit, the management may have committed an actionable
wrong, such as fraud, in preparing the financial statements. Therefore, third parties could sue both
parties based on the theory of joint and several liability. "If the concurrent negligence of two or
more persons combined results in an injury to a third person, they are jointly and severally liable and
the injured person may recover from either or all." 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 102 (1966). However,
in many circumstances, the business has gone bankrupt and is therefore judgment proof. Thus, third
parties do not generally sue the business as well.
9. See Philip R. Lochner, Jr., Black Days for Accounting Firms, WALL ST. J., May 22, 1992,
at AI0.
10. See, e.g., Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992) (Bily sued Arthur Young
to recover the economic loss resulting from its failed investment in Osborne Computer Corporation).
11. In two states, North Carolina and Florida, third parties can maintain a cause of action
against an accountant based on contract theory. Causey, supra note 4,at 392.
12. See Bethlehem Steel, 822 S.W.2d at 592 (RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977));
Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985) (privity of
relationship); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983)
(foreseeability).
13. See Credit Alliance, 483 N.E.2d at 110.
14.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).

15. See Citizens State Bank, 335 N.W.2d at 361. The foreseeability standard stems from the
general principle that a tortfeasor is fully liable for all foreseeable consequences of his actions. Id.
at 366.
16. See Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 367 S.E.2d 609, 616 (N.C. 1988)
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other professions, accounting firms carry malpractice insurance to defray
costs associated with legal actions. 7 However, many of the seminal cases
proposing this rationale of spreading the risk were decided quite a few years
ago,"8 and market conditions, particularly in the insurance industry, have
changed dramatically. 9 Accounting firms cannot obtain adequate
insurance coverage at a reasonable cost.2' Thus, the viability of standards
that expand an accountant's liability to third parties needs to be
reassessed.2'
This Comment evaluates a trend that involves a shift from liberal to
fairly conservative principles concerning third party suits against
accounting firms. Part II of this Comment discusses the three standards and
their underlying policy rationales. Part III focuses upon the important
decisions rendered by California and New York. Part IV describes the use
of insurance as a justification for implementing these standards and argues
that it is no longer a viable solution. Part V argues that states need to
implement a system of comparative negligence without joint and several
liability. Part VI concludes that the adoption of a "pure" comparative
negligence system will provide a fair solution to both third parties and
accountants.
II. A Comparative Analysis of the Three Standards and the Underlying
Policy Rationales
A cogent examination of the current status of third party claims against
accounting firms must begin with Ultramares Corporation v. Touche.22
Ultramares' suit alleged that it relied upon the negligently prepared audit
report of Touche, Niven & Co., the defendant accounting firm.23 Fred

(see also extensive subsequent history); H. Rosenblum, Inc., v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 151 (N.J. 1983);
Citizens State Bank, 335 N.W.2d at 365.
17. See, e.g., Raritan, 367 S.E.2d at 616 (purchasing insurance may aid accountants in preparing
for any loss incurred). See also Alison Leigh Cowan, Settlements Alarming Auditors and Lawyers,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1 1992, at D8; Kenneth H. Bacon, Ernst to Pay $400 Million Over Audit of 4 Big
Thrifts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24 1992, at A3.
18. See Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 138 (decided nine years ago); Citizens State Bank, 335 N.W.2d
at 361 (decided nine years ago).
19. See Cowan, supra note 17, at D8; Lochner, supra note 9, at AI0.
20. See Cowan, supra note 17, at D8. Ernst & Young's $400,000,000 settlement with the
federal government has driven up the cost of its malpractice insurance. Bacon, supra note 17, at A3.
In addition, Ernst's payment may affect other accounting firms' insurance premiums because many
firms utilize the same "big insurance pool." Bacon, supra note 17.
21. Recently, accountants have been practicing without insurance "either because they cannot
obtain it, or because coverage cannot be obtained at a reasonable cost." Causey, supra note 4, at
415.
22. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
23. Id. at 443. Attorneys, like accountants, may be liable for the opinions they render.
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Stem & Co. contracted with defendant to prepare and certify a balance sheet
exhibiting the condition of its business. 24 Fred Stern presented a copy of
Touche's unqualified audit report to Ultramares.2' Plaintiff, in reliance
upon the financial statements and the audit report, loaned money to Fred
Stem. 6 It was subsequently determined that the financial statements had
been falsified by the management of Fred Stern.27 Fred Stern went
bankrupt and did not repay the loan. 28 Thereafter, Ultramares brought suit
against Touche contending that Touche owed them a duty to use ordinary
and reasonable care in the preparation of its report, and its failure to do so
amounted to negligence. 29
The court in Ultramares° held that an accountant does not owe a
duty to a third party to act in a non-negligent manner.3' Instead, the
accountant only owes a duty to its client to use ordinary and reasonable
care." Therefore, under Ultramares,only a party in privity of contract has
standing to sue for negligence.
The court proffered a protective public policy rationale to substantiate
its holding. It reasoned that the liability arising from "a thoughtless slip or
blunder ' '33 or "the failure to detect a theft or forgery"' would impose an
undue burden upon the accounting profession.35 The court, however,
failed to view this matter from the point of view of the victim. A certified
public accountant holds a prominent position in society, particularly in the
business community.36 Creditors such as Ultramares respect the integrity

Attorneys provide formal opinions regarding the legality of proposed financial transactions--such as
mergers and acquisitions. Third parties can sue attorneys for negligently prepared opinions. See
Gary Lawson and Tamara Mattison, A Tale of Two Professions: The Third-Party Liability of
Accountants and Attorneys for Negligent Misrepresentation,52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1309, 1315-17 (1991).
24. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 442.
25. Id. Touche supplied thirty-two copies of the audit report to Ultramares. Id.
26. Id. at 443.
27. Id. A member of the management of the Fred Stern & Co. inserted (in pencil) a credit sales
amount of over $700,000 on the balance sheet to which no corresponding journal entries existed, thus
overstating accounts received. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 443.
28. Id.
29. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 444-47.
30. Id. at 441,444-45.
31. Id. at 444. While accountants do not owe a duty to third parties to use reasonable care, they
do owe third parties a duty to prepare the audit without fraud. The court makes a clear distinction
between negligence and fraud. Id.
32. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 444.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 822 So.2d 592 (Tenn. 1991). Accountants
play a significant role in the current business and financial environment. Id. at 593.
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of the accounting profession enough to require audits before lending
money.37 Moreover, the court failed to consider that its decision may
adversely impact upon lending practices. That is, these victims may not be
as willing to make loans because the privity standard prohibits them from
seeking redress for negligent acts."8
However, in reconciling its opinion with an earlier case,3 9 the court
noted an exception that will support a non-contractual party's standing to
bring a negligence actionY' If the services provided by an accounting firm
comprise the "end and aim ' 4' of its engagement with a third party, a
"nexus" '42 between the parties will arise which is so close that the
relationship approaches privity, "if not completely one with it,"' 43 so that
a third party can bring suit. By entering into such a relationship, the
accountant owes a third party a duty to act with due care even though no
privity of contract exists." In its reasoning 4 the court decided that this
was not inconsistent with its holding 4 because the legal duty in
Ultramares could not be restated in contractual terms. 47 Thus, the court
concluded that a distinct standard, privity of relationship, 8 would support
a negligence action absent privity of contract.

37. Ultramares,174 N.E. at 443. Ultramares expressly conditioned its loan to Fred Stern & Co.
upon Fred Stern procuring and delivering to Ultramares a certified balance sheet. Id.
38. For a contrary position, see text accompanying note 135 discussing the Bily case.
39. Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922). In Glanzer, a seller of beans employed
defendants, who were public weighers. Pursuant to seller's instructions, the weighers gave one copy
of the weight certificate to the seller and a second copy to a prospective buyer, the plaintiff. The
certificate contained an incorrect weight. In reliance upon the inaccurate certificate, the buyer
purchased beans from the seller. The buyer sued the public weighers, alleging that they negligently
prepared the weight certificate. Because defendants knew that the certificate was the end and aim
of the transaction between the buyer and seller, the court held that a sufficient nexus between the
parties, plaintiff and defendant, arose that allowed plaintiff to bring a cause of action despite a lack
of privity. Id. at 275-76.
40. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 445.
41. Id. End and aim refers to the intent of the accountant in preparing and then transferring the
audit report to an investor or creditor. Id. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. v. Peat Marwick
Main & Co., 597 N.E.2d 1080 (N.Y. 1992); Credit Alliance, 483 N.E.2d at 110. See also Glanzer,
135 N.E. at 275.
42. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 445 (nexus represents the particularly close relationship between
the parties), see also Glanzer, 135 N.E. at 275; Credit Alliance, 483 N.E.2d at 110; Security Pacific,
597 N.E.2d at 1080.
43. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 446.
44. Id. at 445-46.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. Ultramares,174 N.E. at 445, 446, see Shofstall v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 351,
359-60 (N.D. Ill.
1978). The district court, applying Illinois state law, found no basis for a negligent
misrepresentation action. Plaintiff failed to allege facts demonstrating privity of relationship.
Without such a showing the action could not be sustained. Id.
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From the seminal decision of Ultramares,49 states have enacted
standards which have expanded, in varying degrees, the legal duty that an
accountant owes to a third party. More than one standard exists because
states have prioritized policy rationales differently. Basically, jurisdictions
follow one of three possible frameworks.'
A. Privity of Relationship
Of the jurisdictions supporting the concept of privity,5 New York
appears to be the leader.52 New York reaffirmed and elaborated53 upon
the Ultramares 54 standard. In Credit Alliance v. Arthur Anderson &
Co., 55 the Court of Appeals of New York concluded that privity of
56
relationship requires conduct which links the accountant to a third party.
The court opined that the conduct requirement will allow for some
flexibility in the application of the privity standard,5 7 while preserving the
"wisdom and policy 58 of precedent. Linking conduct demands, as did the
nexus criterion, that the interaction between an accountant and a third party
possess certain characteristics. 59 For instance, an accountant's knowledge
of an investor's reliance upon an audit report alone will not suffice.60 In
49. Ultramares,174 N.E. at 441.
50. See, e.g., Security Pacific,597 N.E.2d at 1080 (privity of relationship); Bethlehem Steel, 822
S.W.2d at 592 (Restatement); Citizens State Bank, 335 N.W.2d at 361 (foreseeability).
51. Several jurisdictions substantially follow a rule of privity. Of these states, adoption of this
approach has been reached by the highest courts. See Colonial Bank v. Ridley & Schweigert, 551
So.2d 390 (Ala. 1989); Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp of Idaho, 772 P.2d 720 (Idaho
1989); Landell v. Lybrand, 107 A. 783 (Pa. 1919); Citizens National Bank v. Kennedy & Coe, 441
N.W.2d 180 (Neb. 1989); Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 597
N.E.2d 1080 (N.Y. 1992). In three states, the privity standard has been enacted by statute. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-114-302 (Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 1-402(b) (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. §
58-26-12 (Supp. 1990). Finally, federal court decisions have concluded that privity represents the
law of three states whose highest courts have not expressly considered the issue. See Ackerman v.
Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying Indiana law); Stephens Indus. Inc. v. Haskins &
Sells, 438 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971) (applying Colorado law).
52. States cite New York precedent with approval and in many instances adopt the standards
of New York. See, e.g., Colonial Bank, 551 So.2d at 394-95 (citing Credit Alliance v. Arthur
Anderson & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985) with approval and adopting its test); Idaho Bank &
Trust, 772 P.2d at 720 (approving and adopting reasoning of Credit Alliance).
53. CreditAlliance, 483 N.E.2d at 115.
54. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
55. 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 118.
58. Id.
59. Compare, CreditAlliance, 483 N.E.2d at 118-20 (the parties' relationship was the practical
equivalent of privity) with Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 445-46 (the intimacy of the bond between the
parties approximated privity).
60. Credit Alliance, 483 N.E.2d at 120. The court's holding requires that both knowledge and
linking conduct be present. Id. See also Security Pacific,597 N.E.2d at 1080 (Security Pacific could
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addition, linking conduct necessitates that the parties participated in some
sort of direct communication. 6' The court does not state nor intimate,
62
however, that linking conduct provides a perfect substitute for a nexus.
It remains unclear just how flexible this criterion will prove to be in future
decisions. Furthermore, rather than providing a definitive explanation, the
court decided a companion case63 to CreditAlliance whose facts provide
a benchmark for discerning what constitutes linking conduct.
In European American Bank,' linking conduct arose from direct
communicationsO and personal meetings.6 Direct communications
between representatives from the investor and the accounting firm took the
form of both oral and written statements. 67 Moreover, the communication
continued over the entire course of the investor's dealings with the
accounting firm's client.6" In addition, representatives of the parties
personally met to discuss the investor's reliance upon the firm's audit. 69
This conduct also continued over the entire course of business dealings.70
The court's conclusion that the facts of this case demonstrated linking
conduct established precedent that requires a necessarily intimate link
between the parties. 1
While the court in EuropeanAmerican Bank may have restated and
elaborated upon earlier decisions, it adhered to the underlying policy
72 An accountant does not owe a duty to perform
rationale of Ultramares.
or report an audit in a non-negligent fashion to even those who the
accountant may reasonably envision will rely upon the information.7 3
Exposing accountants to liability of such magnitude would impose
untenable hazards. 74 Thus, the court reaffirms the privity of relationship

not maintain its claim against Peat Marwick because it failed to demonstrate a close working
relationship with Peat Marwick's predecessor).
61. Credit Alliance, 483 N.E.2d at 118-20.
62. Id. at 118. The court noted that it "gleaned" the conduct requirement from precedent. Id.
63.. European American Bank and Trust Co. v. Strauhs & Kaye, 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985)
(order amended by Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Anderson Co., 489 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1985)).
64. European American Bank, 483 N.E.2d at 110.
65. Id. at 113.
66. Id.
67. Id. Compare, European American Bank, 483 N.E.2d at 113 (meetings in person and by
written correspondence) with Security Pacific, 597 N.E.2d at 1080 (connection by phone call).
68. European American Bank, 483 N.E.2d at 113.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 120. A recent decision substantially utilized the facts of this matter to distinguish it
from the case at hand. See Security Pacific, 597 N.E.2d at 1080.
72. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
73. Id. at 444.
74. Id.
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standard in order to avoid the perceived difficulties attributable to
expanding an accountant's duty.75
B. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552
Several jurisdictions have adopted the approach developed by
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552.76 The Restatement declares that an
accountant owes a duty to third parties 7 who are not in privity only if the
accountant intends 78 to supply the information for the benefit 79 of a third
party in a specific transaction or type of transaction identified to the
accountant.80 Furthermore, liability only extends to a limited class of third
parties8 who justifiably rely8 2 upon the information.
Adoption of the Restatement rule necessarily contemplates
extending 83 the duty that an accountant owes to third parties beyond the
privity of relationship standard.84 The Restatement does not require
conduct which links an accountant to an investor or creditor.85 Acceptance
of certain public policy factors directs this extension of an accountant's
duty. 6

75. See Credit Alliance, 483 N.E.2d at 115. The court, in expressly adhering to precedent,
"[d]isput[es] the wisdom of extending the duty of care of accountants to anyone who might
foreseeably rely upon their financial reports." id.
76. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992); First Florida Bank, N.A. v. Max
Mitchell & Co., 558 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1990); Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198 (Ga. 1987);
Pahre v. Auditor of State, 422 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1988); Bonhiver v. Graff, 248 N.W.2d 291 (Minn.
1976); Thayer v. Hicks, 793 P.2d 784 (Mont. 1990); Spherex Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 451
A.2d 1308 (N.H. 1982); Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 436 N.E.2d 212 (Ohio 1982);
Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 367 S.E.2d 609 (N.C. 1988) (see subsequent
history); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 822 S.W.2d 592 (Tenn. 1991); Haberman v.
Public Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d 1032 (Wash. 1987), modified 750 P.2d 254 (1988); First Nat'l
Bank v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1989).
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977).
78. Id. at § 552(2)(b).
79. Id. at § 552(2)(a).
80. Id. at § 552(1).
81. Id. at § 552(2)(a).
82.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977).

83. See Bethlehem Steel, 822 S.W.2d at 593-95 (in accepting the Restatement approach the court
necessarily reflected the conduct requirement under the privity standard).
84. For third party claims against attorneys for negligent misrepresentation, most courts favor
the Restatement approach. However, only one court, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals applying
Pennsylvania law, has specifically adopted the Restatement test. In contrast, nine states follow the
privity standard for attorneys' liability. See Lawson and Mattison, supra note 23, at 1322-25.
85. See Crawford, 386 S.E.2d at 311-12 (rejecting foreseeability and privity rules in favor of
"middle ground" offered by Restatement rule). See also Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Anderson
& Co., 483 N.E.2d at 119 n.1 1 (the court rejects the Restatement rule because it, unlike the privity
of relationship standard, does not compel a conduct requirement).
86. Public policy supports a court's decision to extend an actor's duty beyond privity. See
Bethlehem Steel, 822 So.2d at 592 (public policy considerations determine the extent to which
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Consideration of the environment in which accountants and investors
exist and interact provides a policy rationale for extending an accountant's
duty. 8 7 Accountants assume a prominent role in the business
community.88 Specifically, the audit that an accountant prepares provides
investors with the information that they are increasingly relying upon before
engaging in business activity. 89
Courts which have recognized the fundamental role of accountants
have therefore rejected the near-privity approach. 9° The privity rule,
unlike the Restatement, does not adequately provide for the central role of
the audit. 91 It fails because it does not recognize the frequency and
substantial use which an audit receives in today's marketplace. 92
Furthermore, the use of electronic communications, transmissions by fax
machines being one such example, obviates the need to engage in personal
meetings. Thus, jurisdictions implementing the rule of the Restatement
have expanded an accountant's duty to93 try to reconcile the integral use of
audits with the business environment.
However, these jurisdictions have refused to extend the duty to all
foreseeable users of an audit.' Proponents of the Restatement argue that
exposing accountants to liability from any potential third party would be
unduly burdensome. 9 Therefore, due to the perceived unfairness which
this duty would create, 9' these jurisdictions have chosen to confine an
accountant's duty within the limits of the Restatement.97

accountants will be held liable for negligent audits).
87. See Raritan, 367 S.E.2d at 615; H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 149 (N.J.
1983). The accountant's role has expanded from "that of a watchdog for management to an
independent evaluator of the adequacy and fairness of financial statements issued by management to
stockholders, creditors, and others." Id.
88. Raritan, 367 S.E.2d at 615; see also First FloridaBank, 558 So.2d at 15.
89. See Raritan, 367 S.E.2d at 615.
90. See, e.g., Raritan, 367 S.E.2d at 614-16; Bethlehem Steel, 822 So.2d at 593-95; First
FloridaBank, 558 So.2d at 11-16.
91. See Raritan, 367 S.E.2d at 615; see also Bethlehem Steel, 822 So.2d at 593 (privity is a

restrictive standard).
92. See Raritan, 367 S.E.2d at 615; FirstFloridaBank, 558 So.2d at 15; Bethlehem Steel, 822
S.W.2d at 593.
93. See Bethlehem Steel, 822 S.W.2d at 593 (privity does not impose a duty commensurate with
the significance of an accountant's role in the business environment). See also Raritan,367 S.E.2d
at 615 (in light of economic considerations it is desirable to choose the Restatement rule).
94. See FirstFlorida Bank, 558 So.2d at 16 (Restatement rule protects accountants from liability
that unreasonably exceeds the bounds of their real undertaking).
95. Id. at 14-16.
96. See Raritan, 367 S.E.2d at 616 (it would be unfair to subject accountants to liability in
circumstances where they are unaware of the use to which their opinions will be put).
97.

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS

§ 552 (1977).
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C. Foreseeability
Several jurisdictions have extended an accountant's potential liability
beyond even the Restatement rule, by adopting the standard of
foreseeability." Courts in these jurisdictions follow the general rule that
negligent actors should be liable for all reasonably foreseeable
consequences of their negligence." Therefore, under this approach, an
accountant's duty to use reasonable care in preparing and certifying an audit
opinion extends to all third parties who could foreseeably rely upon it."
While this standard ensures that accountants, as any other actor in
society, will be liable for their negligent acts, it can also lead to harsh
results. Publicly held businesses approach accountants to prepare audit
reports in order to comply with federal disclosure requirements. 01 While
the initial engagement contemplated the satisfaction of federal law, this
same business may foreseeably distribute the report to investors."t 2 If it
later turns out that the accountant negligently prepared the audit, the third
party investors can sue the accountant for professional negligence. Thus,
this standard could conceivably lead to third party liability never anticipated
by either the accountant or the business.
These jurisdictions have advocated that foreseeability will promote a
substantial societal interest. That is, the threat of legal action will force the
industry as a whole to improve the quality of its work.10 3 The
foreseeability standard therefore seeks to expand societal utility while
placing the burden upon the accounting industry."
Recent opinions have examined and rejected the belief that an
accountant and other actors in society should be similarly treated.'0 5 In
order to restrict an accountant's duty, these courts have attacked the policy
98. Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983); H. Rosenblum,
Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983). See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins.
Co., 514 So.2d 315 (Miss. 1987) (court adopted foreseeability test in dicta).
99. See, e.g., Citizens State Bank, 335 N.W.2d at 366.
100. See id. See also Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 153.
101. See generally Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 597
N.E.2d 1080 (N.Y. 1992). Federal law requires a publicly-held company to file a certified copy of
its financial statements with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Id.
102. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931). Ultramares contracted with
Touche to prepare and certify thirty-two audit reports. It is highly unlikely that Ultramares required
that many reports for itself or to satisfy filing requirements. Thus, one could reasonably presume that
Ultramares intended to distribute the audit reports to others, including investors. See id. at 442.
103. See Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 152.
104. See International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. 218
(Ct. App. 1986) (overruled by Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (1992)).
105. See, e.g., Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992) (because of the court's
adoption of the Restatement rule, accountants, unlike other actors in society, must be aware of a
specific party and intend to influence that party before a duty arises).
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rationales underlying the original impetus for extending the duty to all
foreseeable parties.'06 Thus, these courts reexamined public policy in
light of today's legal and business environment."
III. Recent Decisions Marking a Shift Toward Conservatism
A. Califomia
The Supreme Court of California in Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.,t0 s
radically altered the basis for which a third party can bring a cause of action
against an accountant. The court disavowed the foreseeability approach
developed through state court precedent.' °9 In reaching its decision, the
court relegated third parties to only one form of action against negligent
accountants.110
The court's restructuring of third party actions did not occur by
accident. Very little of the opinion relates exclusively to the facts of the
matter in dispute.'
Rather, the bulk of the opinion details the audit
function in public accounting, a historical narrative of accountants' liability
and public policy considerations. 12 Thus, the court took the opportunity
presented by the appeal of this matter to confront and change the law in
California.
In this case, Bily, and others, t 3 sued Arthur Young over its audit of
Osborne Computer Corporation. Based upon the audit, Plaintiffs entered
into a financing arrangement with Osborne which failed because Osborne

106. See infra notes 118-27 and accompanying text.
107. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 822 So.2d 592 (Tenn. 1991). "[M]ost
jurisdictions have abandoned th[e] restrictive [privity] standard because it does not impose upon
accountants a duty commensurate with the significance of their role in current business and financial
affairs." Id. at 593.
108. 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
109. Id. at 774. The court rejected the foresecability rule developed in International Mortgage
Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Ct. App. 1986). See, e.g., Citizens
State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983) (an accountant is fully liable for
all foreseeable consequences of his actions).
110. See Bily, 834 P.2d at 768. An accountant will only be liable to third parties for negligent
misrepresentation; third parties may no longer bring an action for professional negligence.
Negligence and negligent misrepresentation are separate and distinct torts. Professional negligence
looks at how the audit was conducted. For example, whether an accountant performed the audit in
conformance with Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) would be one such consideration.
Negligent misrepresentation, on the other hand, goes to whether an accountant made false statements
in the opinion, honestly believing they are true. See id.
111. See id. Of the twenty-nine page majority opinion, four pages relate exclusively to the facts
and disposition of the case. Id.
112. Id. at 749-73.
113. J.F. Shea & Co., et. al., brought a separate claim which was consolidated with the action
by Bily. Bily, 834 P.2d at 748.
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declared bankruptcy. 1 4 Plaintiffs alleged that Arthur Young committed
professional negligence in conducting its audit."' Furthermore, Plaintiffs
alleged reliance6 upon Arthur Young's negligently prepared unqualified
audit opinion."
The court declared that Plaintiffs had only one action, negligent
misrepresentation, against Osborne. 1 7 In order for Plaintiffs to sustain
an action for negligent misrepresentation, the court mandated that the
elements of its newly adopted standard, n8 the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 552,119 must be satisfied.
In adopting the Restatement rule the court explicitly rejected the
foreseeability approach. 2 ° The court departed from precedent 2 '
because it concluded that the Restatement better served the public policy it
wanted to further.
Permitting all merely foreseeable users of audit reports to sue on a
theory of negligent misrepresentation would impose a degree of liability out
of proportion to an auditor's fault. 22 The Restatement rule requires that
accountants receive notice of potential third party claims, 23 thereby
allowing them to ascertain the potential scope of their liability and to make
rational decisions regarding an audit engagement. 24 Therefore, the notice
aspect of the Restatement justifies imposing liability upon an auditor."z
Moreover, the court weighed heavily the characteristics of the
individuals in these lawsuits. 26 Actions such as these typically involve
a "sophisticated class"' 127 of investors. Such parties could expend their
own resources to hire an auditor, perhaps the same as the one doing the
initial audit, to verify the information. 28 Taking this step is known as
114. Id.
115. Id. at 748-49.
116. Id. at 748.
117. Id. at 771-72. Professional negligence focuses on the duty of care employed in conducting
an audit i.e., general negligence. Bily, 834 P.2d at 767.
118. Id. at 774. Prior California cases expressly rejected the Restatement approach because it
could not be reconciled with foreseeability; duty under foreseeability is more expansive. Id. See also
International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Ct. App. 1986)
(case founded California's prior standard of foreseeability).
119. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
120. Bily, 834 P.2d at 774.
121. See International Mortgage, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 218 (overruled by Bily).
122. Bily, 834 P.2d at 762-64.
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(b) (1977).
124. Bily, 834 P.2d at 769.

125. Id.
126.
ordinary
127.
128.

Id. at 765. The investors who read and rely on audit reports are not the equivalent of
consumers. Id.
Id.
Bily, 834 P.2d at 765.
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private ordering. 29 Thus, the court proposes that the third parties
essentially become the clients of the accountants and any subsequent action
would be based-on privity.
While turning to policy to support the adoption of the Restatement
rule, 30 the court declared that policy considerations mitigated against
allowing further lawsuits by third parties based upon professional
negligence.' 3' Proponents of foreseeability substantially rely upon the
belief that it will enhance accountants' work product.' 32 The court in
Bily, however, found differently. 33 The court noted that no empirical
data supports their contention' and also that the foreseeability approach
may force auditors to limit or discontinue service especially in high risk
industries. 135 In fact, the court found that thet36foreseeability standard may
actually promote harmful economic effects.
Through its decision the Supreme Court of California concluded that,
based upon public policy, the duty of an accountant should be
narrowed. 37 It eliminated third party claims of professional
negligence. 3 Furthermore, it limited negligent misrepresentation to a
known group of third parties who justifiably rely upon an accountant's
audit.' 39 Thus, while the court chose to limit accountants' liability, it
refused to go as far as the privity of relationship standard adopted by New
York and other states.
B. New York
In Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. v. Peat Marwick Main &
Co., 40 the Court of Appeals of New York rendered a decision which
evidenced a predominantly conservative view. In this case, Security
Pacific, an investor, loaned money to Top Brass, Inc., a business entity.""

129. Id.
130. Id. at 762-68. The court breaks the policy into the following categories: liability out of
proportion to fault; the prospect of private ordering; and the effect on auditors of negligence liability
to third parties. Id.
131. See id. at 761.
132. See H. Rosenblum Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 152 (N.J. 1983) (this standard will
encourage accountants to exercise greater care leading to greater diligence in audits).
133. Bily, 834 P.2d at 765-66.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 766.
136. Id. at 765.
137. See id. at 767.
138. Bily, 834 P.2d at 767.
139. Id. at 771-72; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Op TORTS § 552 (1977).
140. 597 N.E.2d 1080 (N.Y. 1992).
141. Id. at 1082, 1083.
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Security Pacific allegedly did so in reliance upon Main Hurdman's
unqualified audit opinion of Top Brass.' 42 Peat Marwick succeeded Main
1 43
Hurdman as the accounting firm in charge of auditing Top Brass.
Following Security Pacific's business arrangement with Top Brass, Top
Brass filed for bankruptcy and therefore did not repay the money it
borrowed from Security Pacific.1 " Security Pacific brought an action
against Peat Marwick seeking to hold it liable for the alleged negligence
committed by its predecessor, Main Hurdman. 45 Security Pacific
claimed that the unqualified audit opinion of Main Hurdman negligently
indicated that Top Brass' financial statements accurately reflected its
financial condition. 14
The court held that Peat Marwick was not liable because Security
Pacific failed to sustain a cause of action against them.' 47 It predicated its
holding upon the conclusion that Security Pacific did not produce sufficient
evidence to create a triable issue of fact. 48 Security Pacific failed to

142. Id. at 1083. The standard unqualified audit opinion that an accountant would release to a
business is as follows:
We have examined the balance sheets of ABC Company as of [at] December 31,
19X2 and 19X1, and the related statements of income, retained earnings, and changes in
financial position for the years then ended. Our examinations were made in accordance
with generally accepted auditing standards and, accordingly, included such tests of the
accounting records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the
circumstances.
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly the financial
position of ABC Company as of [at] December, 19X2 and 19X1, and the years then
ended, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles applied on a consistent
basis.
AICPA Professional Standards, Statements on Auditing Standards No. 15, §505.03 (Am. Inst. of
Certified Pub. Accountants 1981).
143. Security Pacific, 597 N.E.2d at 1081.
144. Id. at 1083.
145. Id. at 1081. Thomas J. Shroyer, Accountants and the Dynamics of Duty, 14 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 77, 82 (1988). Shroyer believes that due to the complexity of these matters "tihe
establishment of the standard of due professional care and its breach is ordinarily a matter for expert
testimony. This is equally true in cases brought against accountants since the arcane learning of the
profession is beyond the ken of most lay persons." Id.
146. Security Pacific, 597 N.E.2d at 1083. As a professional, an accountant will be held to a
degree of care which a
reasonably prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances.
One of the factors relevant to the determination of what is reasonable care under the
circumstances is the special knowledge or skills which a defendant possesses. Thus, one
who engages in a business, occupation, or profession must exercise the requisite degree
of learning, skill, and ability of that calling with reasonable and ordinary care.
57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 190 (1989) (citations omitted).
147. Security Pacific, 597 N.E.2d at 1083. The court granted summary judgment to Peat
Marwick. Id.
148. Id. The procedural posture of this action is of critical importance. At the trial level Peat
Marwick moved for summary judgment which was granted. Security Pacific appealed to the
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demonstrate the existence of a relationship between itself and Main
Hurdman which sufficiently approached privity. 149 Based upon
precedent, 50 Security Pacific needed to demonstrate conduct which
linked it and Main Hurdman. While Security Pacific argued that conduct
linking the parties existed, the court rejected this contention."'
The court concluded that Security Pacific's reliance upon a phone call
between it and Main Hurdman did not establish conduct which linked the
tWO.152 During a phone conversation,5 3 a representative from Security
Pacific told the Main Hurdman partner in charge of the Top Brass audit that
Security Pacific would be relying upon the audit in making its decision
regarding the loan. The court, while focusing primarily upon this
communication,'M decided that it did not link Main Hurdman to Security
Pacific for two principal reasons.
First, the phone call did not establish a direct nexus. 55 The court
distinguished these facts from an earlier decision in which a relationship
sufficiently approaching privity existed. A phone call is in fact a direct
communication.
However, the court reasoned that it will not be enough in
56
itself.
of
and
The court improperly weighs this evidence by utilizing a quantitative
rather than qualitative analysis. A representative from Security Pacific told
a partner from Main.Hurdman that Security Pacific would be utilizing the

Appellate Division which reversed the trial court but granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Id.
149. Id. at 1085. The court declared that it was following the reasoning, regarding privity of
relationship, found in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931), which was later
reaffirmed and expanded upon in Credit Alliance v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 483 N.E.2d I10 (N.Y.
1985).
150. See Glanzer v. Shepherd, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922); Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 441; White
v. Guarante, 372 N.E.2d 315 (N.Y. 1977); CreditAlliance, 483 N.E.2d at 110.
151. Security Pacific, 586 N.Y.S.2d at 1085 (the court decided that even viewing Security
Pacific's evidence in the most favorable light it did not amount to more than generalities).
152. Id. at 1085. The dissent argued that the majority's requirement that Security Pacific must
prove linking conduct at this stage is erroneous. On a motion for summary judgment, a party need
only present a sufficient showing to establish a triable issue of fact. Security Pacific, 597 N.E.2d at
1088 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 1082-83.
154. Id. The phone call comprises only part of the evidence establishing privity of relationship.
Other actions demonstrating linking conduct include Main Hurdman's: preparation and circulation
of an audit planning memo referring to the previous year in which Security Pacific and Top Brass
negotiated for a loan similar to the one in dispute; receipt and acknowledgement of Top Brass'
official minutes authorizing the credit negotiations with Security Pacific; receipt and consideration
of a "pencil draft" which noted the credit negotiations in planning the previous year's audit; and
reference to Security Pacific's credit negotiations as an item to be considered. Id. at 1092 (Hancock,
J., dissenting).
155. Security Pacific, 597 N.E.2d at 1085; see Credit Alliance, 483 N.E.2d at 116-17.
156. Security Pacific, 597 N.E.2d at 1085.
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audit information to make its investment decision. 5 7 It should not matter
that Security Pacific conveyed this information in only one conversation.
But, until the judiciary of New York properly evaluates this matter, a party
will need to present evidence of frequent and direct communication as well
as communication of a personal nature in order to succeed. 5
Second, the court focused upon the end and aim of the audit. 5 9 The
record indicated that Top Brass retained Main Hurdman to perform the
audit principally to comply with a filing requirement pursuant to federal
law. t ' To establish a relationship sufficiently approaching privity, a third
party needs to establish that the primary end and aim of auditing a business
entity was to provide an investor or creditor with the necessary financial
information.'6 t
Main Hurdman's knowledge of Security Pacific's intended use of the
information overrides the end and aim criterion. While Main Hurdman
found out about Security Pacific's use of the audit following its agreement
with Top Brass, Main Hurdman knew prior to submitting the audit to Top
Brass. 62 Main Hurdman could have disclaimed any liability concerning
Security Pacific's investment decision. However, it did not.
Thus, the court in Security Pacific'6 3 mandated a standard which
seems to be an insightful application of precedent, but it can be viewed as
promulgating a privity standard in its purest form absent a signed
agreement.' 64 In the future, a party will need to establish a continual
personal relationship conducted primarily for the benefit of the
investor.t 65

157. Id. at 1082-83.
158. Id. at 1085-86 (to support its contention that something more than one interaction is
necessary, the court relies substantially upon differentiating these facts from earlier cases such as
European American Bank, Glanzer, and Ultramares).
159. Id. at 1086; see Credit Alliance, 483 N.E.2d at 116-17.
160. Security Pacific, 597 N.E.2d at 1086-87.
161. Id.; see also European Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Strauhs & Kaye, 483 N.E.2d 110, 120
(N.Y. 1977) (linking conduct found where the primary end and aim of the audit was to provide the
investor with the financial information it required).
162. Security Pacific, 597 N.E.2d at 1082-83. For purposes of summary judgment, Peat
Marwick, as the moving party, conceded Security Pacific's contentions as true. Id.
163. 597 N.E.2d 1080 (N.Y. 1992).
164. See Security Pacific, 597 N.E.2d at 1095 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 1086-87 (the majority appears to be declaring that the standard for liability will be
a relationship or specific undertaking similar to that in European American Bank and sufficiently
intimate to pass the privity test of Ultramares and Glanzer).
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IV. Reassessing the Policy Rationale of Spreading the Risk through
Malpractice Insurance
Recent economic changes necessitate a reevaluation of the approaches
which permit those not in privity of relationship to bring a cause of action
against accountants.6t Jurisdictions adopting the foreseeability approach
have chosen to extend an accountant's duty to all foreseeable users because
of certain policy rationales. 6 7 One such rationale dictates that
can spread the risk through the use of malpractice
accountants
6
insurance.1 1
States recognize that either the third parties or the accountants will
bear the cost.' 69 Requiring the accountant to bear the burden is the choice
that has been made by some states. 7 In reaching this conclusion, the
courts of these states focus upon the culpability of the parties.'
By
analyzing the disparity between the parties' actions, these courts believe this
to be the fair result. 7 2 Also, social interests will benefit by having
accountants pay for the losses.
The rationale is also based upon the premise that preventing third
parties from recovering will cause deleterious economic effects.7 Third
parties will be forced to pay the cost. 74 This, in turn, may increase the
75
cost of credit because the costs will be passed onto the general public.
Additionally, courts believe that the accounting profession can better handle
the burden because it can internalize the expense. 76 Accountants, who
must absorb higher costs, can pass these expenses to others including their
clients. 77 Therefore, the proponents of foreseeability believe that

166. Large claims against professionals such as accountants have lead to more expensive
insurance premiums, if coverage is available at all. See Cowan, supra note 17, at D8.
167. See H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983); Citizens State Bank v. Timm,
Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983); see also International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler
Accountancy Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Ct. App. 1986) (rationale before being overturned).
168. See Citizens Stale Bank, 335 N.W.2d at 365 (the costs refer to expenses concerned with
business failures, such as bad loans).
169. Id. at 365. Third parties would include, for example, creditors. Id.
170. See id. at 365; Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 151.
171. See InternationalMortgage, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27 (overruled).
172. See id.
173. See Citizens State Bank, 335 N.W.2d at 365.
174. See id. This would occur if third parties could not recover their losses. Id.
175. Id. Third parties will be forced to either internalize the losses or hire accountants to verify
the statements. Citizens State Bank, 335 N.W.2d at 365.
176. See Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 151 (accountants have used insurance to cover losses from
other actions, such as fraud, so the industry will be able to cover losses resulting from negligence
claims).
177. Compare, International Mortgage, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27 (overruled) (the act of
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imposing the costs upon the accounting profession provides a fair and
efficient result.
States implementing the Restatement rule believe that accountants
should bear the cost because of the resulting efficiencies which the use of
insurance will provide.7 8 Unlike the foreseeability standard, the
Restatement rule' 79 provides that an accountant must be aware of and
intend to supply auditing information to a potential investor.'8 °
Possessing such awareness, accountants can obtain insurance to mitigate
any future liability.' 8 ' Thus, because accountants can carry insurance,
they will be in a better position to prepare for liability.'8 2
Even accepting the underlying arguments as true, this policy does not
hold true because the use of insurance does not provide an acceptable
alternative. 8 3 Unlike the era when many of the cases that support this
policy were decided, in today's marketplace standard insurance policies are
not a reasonable alternative.' 84 Malpractice insurance is scarce."'
Furthermore, because deductibles tend to be so enormous, the available
coverage is tenuous at best. 86 Thus, because the protection afforded by
insurance policies no longer delivers a viable solution, jurisdictions should
seek other solutions.
V. Proposal
The legislative and judicial branches of each state need to examine and
take action in connection with the crisis in the accounting industry. 7

accountants transferring the costs to members of the public will have beneficial consequences) with
Citizens State Bank, 335 N.W.2d at 365 (if third parties transfer the costs to others in the public
harmful economic consequences will result).
178. See Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 367 S.E.2d 609, 616 (N.C. 1988).
179.

RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).

180. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
181. See Raritan, 367 S.E.2d at 616.
182. See id.
183. See Cowan, supra note 17, at D8; Lochner, supra note 9, at A10; Joseph P. Dawson,
Auditors' Third Party Liability: An Ill-Considered Extension of the Law, 46 WASH. L. REV. 675,
682-85 (1971) (accountant's liability insurance is not a complete answer). See also Stephen M.
Lazare, H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler: A Foreseeably UnreasonableExtension of an Auditor's Legal
Duty, 48 ALB. L. REV. 876, 911-13 (1984). Historically, insurance rates for accountants have not
risen dramatically despite a potentially enormous amount of liability. However, extending liability
for negligent misrepresentation may create a yet unknown variable. Thus, the past may not serve as
a fair predictor for the future of insurance rates. Id.
184. See Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 822 S.W.2d 592 (Tenn. 1991). Changes
in the business and financial environment necessitate a reassessment of the privity standard. See id.
185. Cowan, supra note 17, at D8.
186. Cowan, supra note 17, at D8.
187. Commentators have proposed that state legislatures should become involved. "In view of
the complexity of the issues surrounding the role of the accounting industry and lack of
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The scarcity and high cost of obtaining professional malpractice insurance
evidences the plight which now confronts a profession faced with either
settling or litigating lawsuits.18 8 In either event, the expenses are
enormous.8 9 One solution may result from abrogating joint and several
liability' 90 in connection with an accountant's professional liability and
then enforcing a "pure '' comparative negligence system."
Third party investors and creditors have suffered financial injuries as
a result of accounting malpractice.' 9 a Parties other than accountants,
however, contribute to such injuries.' 94 The businesses audited by the
accountants may have acted negligently. 9 5 In many instances the
businesses have gone bankrupt and cannot compensate the plaintiff for their
negligence. 96 Therefore, the accountants must not only pay for their

understanding of limitations on its functions, the matter of accountants' professional liability should
be addressed by the legislature of each state." Causey, supra note 4, at 415-16.
188. See supra notes 17-20, 168-186 and accompanying text.
189. Ernst & Young recently agreed to pay the federal government $400,000,000 to settle charges
pending against it arising from its audit of four failed savings and loan institutions. This represents
the largest settlement the government has ever obtained as a result of professional malpractice. See
Bacon, supra note 17.
190. Joint and several liability arises "[i]f the concurrent negligence of two or more persons
combined results in an injury to a third person" and both parties are "jointly and severally liable and
the injured person may recover from either or all." 65 C.J.S. Joint and Several Liability § 102
(1966).
191. This comment examines the aspects of pure comparative negligence as it relates to a
comparative negligence system with or without joint and several liability, i.e. whether or not a
tortfeasor will be required to pay more than his or her proportionate liability. See, e.g., Bartlett v.
New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 646 P.2d 579 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982). It does not address whether
a plaintiff may recover from a defendant even though the plaintiff's degree of fault exceeds the
defendant's. See generally, HEFT AND HEFt, Comparative Negligence Manual (1971).
192. Comparative negligence is defined as "that doctrine in the law of negligence by which the
negligence of the parties is compared, and a recovery permitted, notwithstanding the contributory
negligence of plaintiff." 65A CJ.S. Joint and Several Liability § 169 (1966).
193. See, e.g., Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 749 (Cal. 1992) (investors lost over
$4.3 million which they invested in Osborne Computer Corporation).
194. See infra note 196.
195. Seventeen insurance companies filed a lawsuit against the Officers and Directors of PharMor Inc., Coopers and Lybrand, and others. Plaintiffs allege that Phar-Mor fraudulently understated
expenses, overstated accounts receivable, and inflated inventories. Coopers & Lybrand allegedly
conducted its audit of Phar-Mor in a negligent manner; the plaintiffs allege that the fraudulent
practices should have been revealed through the auditing process. Gabriella Stem, Phar-Mor
Officers, Directors Face Suit By 17 Insurers Over Investment in Firm, WALL ST. J.,
April 26, 1993,
at B7B.
196. Dan Goldwater, an attorney for the New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants,
commented on the Arizona Superior Court's decision to vacate the verdict against Price Waterhouse.
Mr. Goldwater stated that the decision probably will not deter plaintiffs from bringing these types
of suits. He added, however, that the courts have finally realized that accountants should not be the
defendants of last resort after companies collapse or encounter business problems. Lee Burton, Judge
Voids Big Tort Award On Price's Audit, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 1992, at A3.
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own fault but also for that of the bankrupt business; such a system exists
under joint and several liability."
Fairness should be the central focus of these lawsuits.' 98 Joint and
several liability creates an unfair result because it advocates having one of
the tortfeasors pay the whole award.' 99 By implementing a comparative
negligence system without joint and several liability,2' injured parties
will be compensated by tortfeasors according to their proportionate
liability.

20 1

Some states have already adopted a pure comparative negligence
system.2°2 While it would be possible for states to isolate this system to
accountant's liability, 2 3 the vast majority apply proportionate liability to
2 N However, many states still follow joint and several
all tortfeasors.
5
liability.

20

197. Under these facts, the accountants and the business would be joint tortfeasors. Joint
tortfeasors are "persons who have acted in concert in their tortious conduct and are, accordingly,
jointly and severally liable." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 839 (6th ed. 1990). As joint tortfeasors,
both "may be held liable for the entire amount of the damage." Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding
Supply, Inc., 646 P.2d 579, 581 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 648 P.2d 794 (N.M. 1984)
(involving an auto accident not accounting malpractice).
198. Under a pure comparative negligence system "fairness is achieved by basing liability on a
person's fault." Bartlett, 646 P.2d at 582. Pure comparative negligence "hold[s] a person fully
responsible for his or her acts and to the full extent to which they cause injury. That is justice."
Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 275 N.W.2d 511, 518 (Mich. 1979).
199. "There is nothing inherently fair about a defendant who is 10% at fault paying 100% of the
loss, and there is no social policy that should compel defendants to pay more than their fair share of
the loss." Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (Kan. 1978).
200. States adopting comparative negligence have split as to whether to retain joint and several
liability as well. That is, some states have retained it while others have specifically abolished it.
VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, Comparative Negligence, § 16.3 (2d ed. 1986).
201. In construing their states comparative negligence statute, the Kansas Supreme Court
concluded that the legislature "intended to equate recovery and duty to pay to degree of fault."
Brown, 580 P.2d at 873-74. The court went on to hold that the doctrine of joint and several liability
is incompatible with their comparative negligence statute and abolished it. Id. The applicable Kansas
statute states:
Where the comparative negligence of the parties in any action is an issue and recovery
is allowed against more than one party, each such party shall be liable for that portion of
the total dollar amount awarded as damages to any claimant in the proportion that the
amount of his or her causal negligence bears to the amount of the causal negligence
attributed to all parties against whom such recovery is allowed.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(d) (1983).
202. See generally Schwartz, supra note 200, at § 16.4.
203. Cf. Soeldner v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp., 473 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Wis. 1979)
(the court found the manufacturer-defendant liable only for its own negligence).
204. See generally Heft and Heft, supra note 191, at §§ 3.10-3.583.
205. Several states have decided to retain joint and several liability under comparative negligence.
See, e.g., Wheeling Pipe Line, Inc. v. Edrington, 535 S.W.2d 225 (Ark. 1976); Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,
532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975); Dunham v. Kampman, 547 P.2d 263 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975), affd 560
P.2d 91 (Colo. 1977); Tucker v. Union Oil Co., 603 P.2d 156 (Idaho 1979); Rice v. Hyster Co., 540
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Comparative negligence can be implemented in one of two ways.
Legislatures have passed laws which explicitly mandate pure comparative
negligence. 2° In other cases, courts have held that their respective states
follow this doctrine rather than joint and several liability.2°
In order to introduce a measure of fairness in the area of accountant's
liability, states should adopt pure comparative negligence without joint and
several liability.2" States which do not follow this system unjustly favor
plaintiffs over defendants. 2°9
VI. Conclusion
Three standards exist which ultimately dictate whether a third party
has standing to sue an accountant. Under privity of relationship, the
strictest standard, third parties must demonstrate a close working
relationship with an accountant. In comparison, the other two standards, the
Restatement rule and foreseeability, do not require such a close relationship,

P.2d 989 (Or. 1975); Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 588 P.2d 1308 (Wash.
1978); Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979). In retaining joint and
several liability, the California Supreme Court proffered three arguments for its decision: 1) while
fault may be apportioned on a comparative basis, this does not make an indivisible injury divisible
for purposes of joint and several liability; 2) the difference between the negligence of the plaintiff
and the defendant; and 3) joint and several liability will allow an injured plaintiff to receive adequate
compensation. See Li, 532 P.2d at 1226. See also James R. Adams, Settlements After Li: But is it
"Fair"?,10 PAC. L.J. 729, 739-40 (1979).
206. The Utah legislature, for example, passed a law explicitly abolishing joint and severally
liability. The law states that, "the maximum amount for which a defendant may be liable to any
person seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of the damages equivalent to the percentage
or proportion of fault attributed to that defendant." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-40 (1990). See also
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(d) (1983). See generally Schwartz, supra note 200, at § 16.4. The
Oklahoma legislature, however, did not address the issue of joint and several liability in its
comparative negligence statute.
In all actions hereafter brought, whether arising before or after the effective date of this
act, for negligence resulting in personal injuries or wrongful death, or injury to property,
contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, unless any negligence of the person so
injured, damaged or killed, is of greater degree than any negligence of the person, firm
or corporation causing such damage, or unless any negligence of the person so injured,
damaged or killed, is of greater degree than the combined negligence of any persons,
firms or corporations causing such damage.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 13 (West 1979). Because states such as California adopted comparative
negligence while retaining joint and several liability commentators argue that further remedial action,
such as legislation, will be necessary. See Adams, supra note 205, at 748.
207. The Court of Appeals of New Mexico specifically abolished joint and several liability and
adopted pure comparative negligence. Bartlett, 646 P.2d at 586. A federal district court in
Wisconsin found the doctrine of joint and several liability inapplicable to the matter in dispute.
Soeldner v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp., 473 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
208. See supra notes 190-201 and accompanying text.
209. "Joint and several liability is not to be retained in our pure comparative negligence system
on the basis that a plaintiff must be favored." Bartlett, 646 P.2d at 586.
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and thus serve to expand the number to whom an accountant owes a duty
of care. States have chosen to adopt one standard over another based upon
policy rationales.
One such rationale suggests that accountants can spread the risk of loss
through the use of insurance. Proponents of both the Restatement rule and
foreseeability argue that insurance maintains the viability of these
standards. However, changes in the business environment may undermine
this public policy rationale. Members of the accounting profession cannot
obtain adequate insurance at a reasonable cost due to the insurance
industry's concern that accountants have become a high risk. Thus, the
insurance crisis in the accounting profession mandates that states take
action.
Implementing "pure" comparative negligence without joint and several
liability will provide a solution. Such a system will provide a fair solution
for both plaintiffs and accountants. While the accounting profession will
be liable for any harm it may have caused, it will not be responsible for
harm caused by the business it audits.
Joseph M. Sembrot

